Efficient entry     Efficient entry  Entry  Commitment       font style='font-size:12px;'> 2015/7/17

We present a dynamic entry game, in which entry costs become sunk gradually. In equilibrium the most profitable firms enter, as they commit faster not to exit. This rationalizes an equilibrium select...

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Input Constraints and the Efficiency of Entry: Lessons from Cardiac Surgery     Government Legislation  Health Care  Treatment  Medical Specialties       font style='font-size:12px;'> 2015/4/22

Prior studies suggest that, with elastically supplied inputs, free entry may lead to an inefficiently high number of firms in equilibrium. Under input scarcity, however, the welfare loss from free ent...

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