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搜索结果: 1-14 共查到密码学 Forgery Attack相关记录14条 . 查询时间(0.084 秒)
A Practical Forgery Attack on Lilliput-AE     Lilliput-AE  lightweight  cryptanalysis       font style='font-size:12px;'> 2019/7/26
Lilliput-AE is a tweakable block cipher submitted as a candidate to the NIST lightweight cryptography standardization process. It is based upon the lightweight block cipher Lilliput, whose cryptanalys...
Forgery Attack on mixFeed in the Nonce-Misuse Scenario     AEAD  forgery  mixFeed  Nonce Misuse       font style='font-size:12px;'> 2019/5/13
mixFeed [CN19] is a round 1 candidate for the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Standardization Project. It is a single-pass, nonce-based, AES-based authenticated encryption algorithms. The authors claim ...
Forgery Attack on SNEIKEN     SNEIK  forgery attack  differential cryptanalysis       font style='font-size:12px;'> 2019/4/23
This document includes a collision/forgery attack against SNEIKEN128/192/256, where every message with more than 128 bytes of associated data can be converted into another message with different assoc...
The recent lattice-based signature scheme Dilithium, submitted as part of the CRYSTALS (Cryptographic Suite for Algebraic Lattices) package, is one of a number of strong candidates submitted for the N...
We analyze the security of Android KeyStore, a system service whose purpose is to shield users credentials and cryptographic keys. The KeyStore protects the integrity and the confidentiality of keys b...
A Forgery Attack against PANDA-s     PANDA  Forgery Attack  Nonce Misuse       font style='font-size:12px;'> 2016/1/25
PANDA is an authenticated encryption scheme designed by Ye et al., and submitted to the CAESAR competition. The designers claim that PANDA-s, which is one of the designs of the PANDA-family, provide...
A Practical Universal Forgery Attack against PAES-8     PAES-8  Universal Forgery Attack  Nonce Misuse       font style='font-size:12px;'> 2016/1/25
PAES is an authenticated encryption scheme designed by Ye et al., and submitted to the CAESAR competition. The designers claim that PAES-8, which is one of the designs of the PAES-family, provides ...
Generic Universal Forgery Attack on Iterative Hash-based MACs     HMAC  NMAC  hash function  universal forgery       font style='font-size:12px;'> 2016/1/9
In this article, we study the security of iterative hash-based MACs, such as HMAC or NMAC, with regards to universal forgery attacks. Leveraging recent advances in the analysis of functional graphs ...
COPA is a block-cipher-based authenticated encryption mode with a provable birthday-bound security under the assumption that the underlying block cipher is a strong pseudorandom permutation, and its...
ALE is a new authenticated encryption algorithm published at FSE 2013. The authentication component of ALE is based on the strong Pelican MAC, and the authentication security of ALE is claimed to be...
ALE is a new authenticated encryption algorithm published at FSE 2013. The authentication component of ALE is based on the strong Pelican MAC, and the authentication security of ALE is claimed to be...
128-EIA3 is an integrity algorithm considered for adoption as a third integrity algorithm by European Telecommunication Standard Institute (ETSI) for 4th generation of GSM networks.128-EIA3 is vul- ne...
Birthday Forgery Attack on 128-EIA3 Version 1.5     secret-key cryptography  Message Authentication Code       font style='font-size:12px;'> 2011/6/9
128-EIA3 is an integrity algorithm considered for adoption as a third integrity algorithm by European Telecommunication Standard Institute (ETSI) for 4th generation of GSM networks.128-EIA3 is vul- ne...
In this note we show that the message authentication code 128-EIA3 considered for adoption as one of the integrity algorithms of the emerging mobile standard LTE is vulnerable to a simple existential ...

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